Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1962

Vern C. Strand and Eleanor A. Strand v. Fred
Mayne and Detta Ann Mayne : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
George K. Fadel; Attorney for Appellants;
Lewis J. Wallace and Robert E. Froerer; Attorneys for Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Strand v. Mayne, No. 9707 (Utah Supreme Court, 1962).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4100

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

r-----------------------J
CASE NO. 9707
IN THE

SUPREME COURt
OF THE

.D
I

~- 1()f')Q
v

' • .l,

'-

STATE OF UTAH:··---·------.. ····---.
Supr£mo

C~·,;r-.-

VERN C. STRAND and ELEANOR A. STRAND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
FRED MAYNE and DE'ITA ANN MAYNE,
Defendants-Respondents.

Respondents' Brief
On Appeal from the Judgment of the Second District Court
for Weber County, Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Judge.
LEWIS J. WALLACE
ROBERT E. FROERER
Attorneys for Respondents

512 Eccles Building,
Ogden, Utah

GEORGE K. FADEL
Attorney for Appellants

170 West Fourth South Street
Bountiful, Utah

1-------------------------------------Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE -------------------------------------------- I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT -------------------------·--------------

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------------·----- 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------·---------------- 2
POINTS OF ISSUE -------------------------------------·---·-·-·-·····----·-·-···--·--···· 1I
Point I: Whether or not appellants were induced by
the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of
respondents into purchasing the premises in
question ... ····-------· ___________________ ... ____ .. ------------... --··--. ..... 11
Point 2: Whether or not appellants are entitled to
recover anything whatever from the respondents on their theory of unjust enrichment .......... 12
LAW ___ ··--·-----------------------_____ . . ________________ .... __ .... __________________ .. _____ . ___ . _.... 12

ARGUMENT ----····-------··-------···------ --·------ ___ --·--- -----··--·-·-- _____ .............. 18
CONCLUSION ______ .______________________ ---------· __________ ...... ___ .______ ..... _.. _... .. . 22

CASES CITED
Cole vs. Parker, 5 U. 2d. 263, 300 Pac. 2d. 623 ---------·----····---··--··· 17
Dupler vs. Yates, I 0 U. 2d. 251, 351 Pac. 2d. 624 ----·····--···-···-· 20
Frailey vs. McGarry, 116 U. 504, 211 Pac. 2d. 840 ----···-···-··-·-·-- 12
LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 U. 260, 109 Pac. 2,
Ann. Cas. 1912-C 407 --------------------------·------------------------------··· 12
Malmberg vs. Baugh, 62 U. 331, 218 Pac. 975 ---·--·--------------·-----· 13
McKeller Real Estate and Investment Co. vs.
Paxton, 62 U. 97, 2I8 Pac. 128 ---------------····-·--··-·····-·--·-···---- 12
Pee~ vs. Judd, 7 U. 2d. 420, 326 Pac. 2d. 712 ---·------------·-·········· 12

Pender vs. Alix, II U. 2d. 58, 354 Pac. 2d. 1066 ------------------··---- 20
Taylor vs. Moore, 87 U. 493, 51 Pac. 2d. 222 -·--·--------·--·-····-····· 12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CASE NO. 9707
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
VERN C. STRAND and

ELEANOR A. STRAND

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

FRED MAYNE and
DETTA ANN MAYNE
Defendants-Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by vendees under a uniform real estate contract by which they purchased a
dilapidated commercial motel property (contrary to expert advice not to do so) for the purpose of making
''extra money," made repairs and put a false front on it,
sold it for a substantial profit, lost it through mismanagement and neglect, and by this action seek to recover
their alleged losses from the vendors.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
From a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice upon motion of the defendants for
summary judgment, the plaintiffs appeal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the judgment
and permission to go to trial upon the merits. DefendantsRespondents seek affirmation of the summary judgment
granted by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts as they appear from the pleadings and
from the deposition of the appellant, Vern C. Strand,
and from the appellants' answers to the respondents' interrogatories on file herein, are stated at some length to
save the Court the time and trouble of ferreting them out,
as follows:
On or about April1, 1955, appellants purchased from
respondents the motel and premises described in that
Uniform Real Estate Contract attached to appellants'
complaint ( R. 5) and referred to therein as Exhibit "A",
consisting of 17 units and a house and a new, uncompleted vacant building <Dep .. p. 37) for the sum of
$41,500.00, payable $7,578.58 down (the agreed value of
contracts assigned and transferred to the respondents by
the appellants) and the balance payable according to the
terms of that contract, pursuant to which appellants took
possession of the premises and operated them through
a hired manager, who lived in the house on the premises
<Dep. p. 37), for a period of approximately two years
<Dep. p. 27) until they sold it to F. C. Watterson and
Mae Watterson by Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
March 20, 1957, attached to respondents' amended answer and counterclaim <R. 22) and referred to therein ~
"Exhibit I," for the sum of $63,000.00, at a profit of
$21,500.00, on which sale they received as a down payment the sum of $500.00 cash plus an equity in a cafe
in Nephi of the acknowledged value of $12,662.00, or a
total down payment of $13,162.00.
The premises were observed by appellants to be in
f)

.....
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a run-down condition at the time appellants purchased
them from respondents (Dep. pp. 12, 13, 14, IS, 16, 17,
19, 20, 21, 22, 24); all of the units were not occupied
<Dep. pp. 22, 23); two new units were unfinished (Dep.
p. 23); respondent Mayne recommended that the new
units be completed into a double unit, (Dep. p. 24) and
so did appellant's wife, <Dep. p. 25), but appellant Strand
made it into a cafe which appellants "rented" at first
and then "leased" <Dep. p. 25); the units were not the
over-night type for transients but were occupied for the
most part by permanent residents, one tenant having
been there for seven years (Dep. p. 23); the repairs made
by appellants did not appreciably increase the rental income (Appellants' answer 91 to the respondents' interrogatory 91, RSO); appellants kept the rates "pretty much
the same" as they were before ( Dep. p. 26).
Before appellants made the purchase, appellant
Strand brought one Beth Roberts, a successful motel
operator in Salt Lake City and Las Vegas, Nevada, (Dep.
p. 35) to look at the premises and advise with him about
it, (Dep. p. 12); was told he was going to have to put a
lot of money and time and a lot of work "to put them in
shape to rent out" <Dep. pp. 12, 13, 23, 24); but appellants did not take the counsel and advice of their
experienced and "competent" adviser (Dep. pp. 13, 35);
appellant Strand admitted that "she was sure right" and
that he "should have listened to her" <Dep. p. 24), and
admitted that afterwards she (Beth Roberts) said "I told
you so." <Dep. p. 35). Appellant Strand said it was the
"biggest mistake" of his life ( Dep. p. 20), said he didn't
think he needed a builder to check it for him and that
that was his fault and his wife's <Dep. pp. 18, 64), said
he would have been a lot better off if he had not sold
to Wattersons <Dep. p. 31), admitted he "could have
made the payments" if he had not sold to W attersons
<Dep. p. 31), admitted that he could have "paid the
property out" if he had not sold to Wattersons <Dep.

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

p. 31), admitted that if the W attersons had "been good
purchasers and had paid out" appellants would have
made a "nice profit" <Dep. p. 34), and "could have got"
his "money out of it" and "wouldn't have lost anything"
(Dep. p. 34) and would have "got rid of one more headache, the trouble of going out there every night." (Dep.
p. 34).
Appellants stated that they believed the premises
had a value of $35,000.00 at the time they purchased
them and had a value of $63,000.00 at the time they sold
them. (Appellants' answer 85 to respondents' interrogatory 85, R. 50). At the bottom of page 32 and top of page
33 of appellant Strand's deposition, he states that the
repairs and improvements placed upon the premises, as
alleged in- paragraph 4 of his complaint, increased the
market value of the premises by $25,000.00, although he
did not have any appraisal made (Dep. pp. 33, 34), saying "that was just a figure that I figured", merely his own
"personal estimate" ·(Dep. p. 33). The cost of $41,500.00
and the alleged increase of $25,000.00 would equal
$66,500.00. Appellant Strand tried to sell the premises to
W attersons for $75,000.00, but finally took ·wattersons'
offer of $63,000.00, because of the fact that appellant
was· tired of "going out there and back every dog-goned
night" and because his "wife was hollering about it."
. (Dep. p. 33). The inflated sale price realized by appellants
on their sale to the W attersons was not the true value of
the premises. Competent appraisers fixed the value at
$35,000.00 when they appraised the premises on April
18, 1962, (See Affidavit attached to Respondents' Brief
in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
97) which corresponded to what appellant Strand said
it was worth when he bought it.
W attersons sold the premises to "some people by
the name of Goldsby" (Dep. p. 44); Goldsbys got a divorce
and appellants couldn't find anyone to "collect the money
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from" ( Dep. p. 29); Goldsbys had a partner named
Clinger who at one time was "making a deal with a
Verda Lind." <Dep. p. 45).
It does not appear from appellant Strand's deposition (or elsewhere in the record) what the terms of the
subsequent sales were. However, it is clear from the
deposition that appellants or their counsel would furnish respondents with "the total amount of all the rents
received" by appellants while they were in possession and
"all the payments" received "from the people to whom"
the premises were sold. <Dep. p. 65; also pp. 66 and 67.)
This they did not do.
Appellants said they were unable to account for any
sums which may have passed hands on the subsequent
sales of the premises, (Appellants' answers 9 and 10 to
respondents' interrogatories 9 and 10, R. 47) and were
unable to account for any income or disposition of income or furnish any information concerning the operation
of the motel units or cafe from and after the time appellants sold to Wattersons. <See appellants' answers to
respondents' interrogatories 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19,
25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 49, 50 and 51,

R. 47, 48, 49. >
Appellants' first default under their contract with
respondents was in the fall of 1955 when they failed to
pay the taxes and the respondents applied the monthly
payment on the taxes <Dep. pp. 38, 39). With that exception, although they were "late on several occasions",
appellants evidently never missed a payment until after
they sold to the W attersons <Dep. p. 39). There were
numerous defaults on the part of appellants in the terms
of their contract of purchase from respondents after appellants sold to Wattersons <Dep. pp. 30, 31, 38, 39, 41,
42, 43), and appellants were getting demands from
the Bank which held the escrow agreement ( Dep. p. 38).
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Respondents gave them additional time to make payments and to pay the taxes (Dep. pp. 40, 41, 42).
Appellants never did notify respondents that they
had sold to W attersons, nor did respondents have any
notice of any of the subsequent sales beyond the W attersons. "Nobody notified anybody," admitted appellant
Strand. Appellants recognized their responsibility to see
that respondents got paid so they (appellants) would not
lose the premises, and appellant Strand went to Clinger
and told him he had "to pay" or he (appellant) would
take the loss, and three days later called Clinger and
"really bawled him out." (Dep. p. 48).
Clinger had evidently been appellants' real estate
agent. Appellant Strand said: "He was the one that sold
it to the W attersons from me, but someway he came back
into the pictu,re and when I went out to try and get some
money from Goldsby she told me to collect from Clinger.
I was supposed to collect from him. And he is the guy I
started hounding." (Dep. p. 30).- By the time appellants
had sold to W ?ttersons, they were at least $2,000.00 in
default to respondents <Dep. p. 43) .. Appellants were only required to pay respondents
$375.00 per month·, besides the two $1,000.00 payments
due July 1, 1956, and July 1, 1957. (See Contract marked
Exhibit "A'' attached to appellants' complaint, R. 5). But
their contract of sale to W attersons required W attersons
to pay them $600.00 per month for the months from
April through September, and $375.00 per month for the
months October through March, and in addition
$1,000.00 on August 1, 1957. <See contract marked "Exhibit l" attached to respondents' amended answer and
counterclaim, R. 22). Appellants collected at least some
of the larger $600.00 payments from Wattersons (Dep.
pp. 44, 45). In August appellants learned that W attersons
had sold to Goldsbys, and informed them of the delinquent payments (Oep. p. 44). CTOldsby said Clinger was
6
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to make the payments, and appellants went to Clinger
and got $500.00,~ (Dep. pp. 45, 46) and a promise of
more later <Dep. p. 46). When appellant Strand called
Clinger later, he was told that Verda Lind had bought
the place from Goldsbys; that Goldsbys were getting a
divorce; that they had the place "tied up in court and
didn't know who was 'going to get the Motel'". Appellant
admitted saying to Clinger: "Yes, and in the meantime I
am in a bad spot here because I will be losing the place
and I am going to get some money to pay," adding: "I
can't wait while they are fighting in court and everything." (Dep. p. 46). When Verda Lind backed out later,
Clinger told appellants they had nothing to worry about,
that he (Clinger) was "going to take it and see that"
appellants got "taken care of". (Dep. p. 48). Appellant
Strand quoted Clinger further as saying: "The thing is
I sold the place to Verda Lind and I can go up and pay
off all these payments and put us both in good shape."
<Dep. p. 50).
Appellant Strand stated that if the W attersons had
paid him in accordance with their agreement, or had the
Goldsbys paid in accordance with their agreement, or
had Clinger or Verda Lind paid, he would have turned
that money in on his contract and paid the escrow out
"as fast as possible." ( Dep. p. 50).
Appellant Strand admitted that he was in arrears
at least $1,000.00 plus two monthly payments ($375.00
each) when he got a letter from the Bank saying if he
could catch up by December, 1957, it would be all right;
then said he was given until January, 1958. <Dep. p. 52).
But appellants' complaint alleges that the last payment
was made by appellants on October 3rd, 1957. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that appellants ever
made tender or attempted to renegotiate the contract, or
to refinance or dispose of the property. On January 8,
1958, the escrow holder (Bank) returned the escrow
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papers to respondents. <Dep. p. 58).
As a result of the successive defaults, of non-payments, late payments and failure to pay taxes, respondents were compelled to and did, after legal notice, commence a civil action for repossession of the premises, on
or about January 13th, 1958, in the Weber County Distict Court (Civil action No. 33330, Department No. 2)
against the persons then in possession, namely: one Lucy
Semora and one Verda Lynn (Lind). The premises
were restored to respondents by the judgment and decree
of the Weber County District Court on February lOth,
1958.
Thereafter on May 13, 1958, the present action was
commenced by appellants against respondents.
The complaint <R. 1) contains two causes of action: ( 1) the first alleging that plaintiffs-appellants had
paid and expended a total of $29,020.95, and sought to
have the Court award to them an equitable portion of
that sum on the theory of unjust enrichment; and (2)
the second alleging misrepresentations on the part of the
defendants-respondents as an inducement to persuade
appellants to enter into the contract, claiming damages
of $29,020.95.
The amended answer and counterclaim <R. 15) of
the defendants denies generally the allegations of the
complaint and sets up affirmative defenses thereto.
Respondents affirmative defenses and denial of both unjust enrichment and fraud formed the basis for respondents motion ·for summary judgment. The fourth defense
alleges that plaintiffs carefully inspected the premises
prior to purchase, sought independent counsel and a.dvice did not take the advice received, were not mtsinfo~med or misled by defendants, made their own decision to purchase, and were bound by their co~tr~ct
under which they agreed to accept the property 1n Its
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then condition and agreed that no representations were
made other than those set forth in the con tract itself.
The fifth defense denied fraud and alleges that plaintiffsappellants elected to remain in possession after their alleged discovery and made repairs and did not elect to rescind or repudiate the contract or demand the return of
their down payment, and having so elected were estopped
to do so. The sixth defense alleges that plaintiffs-appellants not only made the elections referred to in the fifth
defense, but made the further election to sell the premises
to the W attersons for a profit and were estopped to make
any claim against the defendants-respondents. The
seventh defense alleges that plaintiffs-appellants repeatedly defaulted under their contract of purchase, and sold
to others, and continued to default, and were in default
when the premises were returned by decree in Civil
action No. 33330 of the Weber County District Court,
Department No.2, on February lOth, 1958. The counterclaim is not an issue on this appeal.
A summary and brief a:oalysis of the figures stated
in the appellants' pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
deposition and admissions, disclose that appellants operated their business venture entirely on respondents'
money and property and their (appellants') profit on the
re-sale of the property to the W attersons, or had opportunity to do so but for their own mismanagement and
neglect:
Appellants' complaint alleges:
Down payment to respondents of ________ $ 7,578.58
Monthly payments to respondents of ____ 10,875.00
Claimed repairs, improvements,
additions and equipment of -------------- 9,567.37
Bonus payment to respondents of ________ 1,000.00
Total

$29,020.95
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Appellants' complaint also alleges that the property
had a reasonable rental value of $450.00 per month.
Respondents' position is that Appellants operated
on Respondents' money and property, and on their profit
from their sale to W attersons, and but for their own
mis-management, etc., had none of their own money in
the venture:
Appellants bought premises for ____________ $41,500.00
and sold them to W attersons for ________ 63,000.00
thereby making a profit of -------------------- 21,500.00
Appellants received on that resale
cash of $500.00 and an equity in
a cafe in Nephi (still being operated by appellants, Dep. p. 10) of
the agreed value of $12,662.00, or
a down payment from Wattersons of $13,162.00
<In addition, appellants acquired
a claim against W attersons of
$8,338.00 for loss of an advantageous bargain when W attersons defaulted, being the difference between their profit of $21,
500.00 arid the down payment of
$13,162.00).
Appellants collected rents in excess
of their alleged reasonable rental
value of the premises ($450.00
per month), or could or should
have done so, which, calculated
on the minimum basis of their
own valuation of $450.00 per
month for 33 months, amounts to
the minimum sutn of ________________________ $14,850.00
Total money not appellants own .... $28,012.00
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In addition appellants had the use
of respondents' property, for
which their contract called for
interest at 5.5%. Deducting appellants' alleged down payment
of $7,578.58 and their alleged
monthly payments of $10,875.00
($18,453.58) from the purchase
price of $41,500.00, would give
the minimum constant unpaid
principal balance of . $23,046.42,
\vhich at 5.5% interest per annum, unpaid, amounts to the further asset use value of ________________________ $ 3,485.68
Total money, property and interest not their own, available to and used by_ appellants __ $31,497.68
From this it is apparent that if the appellants have
lost any money whatever they have no one to blame but
themselves. Appellants have failed to furnish evidence
of their collections or the collections of their transferees
and successor transferees or evidence of the consideration
passing between the W attersons and the successor transferees from the Wattersons. It must, therefore, be presumed that it would have ·been to the disadvantage of
their claims had they done so. The appellants had every
opportunity to make money on their venture, and may
very well have made money so far as the record is concerned.

POINTS OF ISSUE
From the pleadings it is apparent that there are but
two main points of issue to be considered on this appeal:
Point 1: Whether or not appellants were induced by
the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of
respondents into purchasing the premises
11
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in question.
Point 2: Whether or not appellants are entitled to
recover anything whatever fom the respondents on their theory of unjust enrichment.
LAW
Point 1: Whether or not appellants were induced by
the alleged fraud and misrepresentations of
respondents into purchasing the premises
in question.
In view of the facts in this case, it is apparent that
appellants contentions on their allegations of fraud are
contrary to the holdings of this Court. In the case of
Peck vs. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 Pac. 2d 712, the Court
said in part, on page 714 of the Pacific citation:
"It should be observed that as to the premises
being unfit for habitation as rental units, the
defendant, upon discovery of such conditions,
failed to offer to deliver up the premises and
demand the down payment. If defendant intended to rely upon fraud as alleged, such action would
have been essential."
To the same effect are Frailey vs. McGarry, 116
Utah 504, 211 Pac. 2d 840; and Taylor vs. Moore, 87
Utah 493, 51 Pac. 2d 222; McKeller Real Estate and
Investment Co., vs. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 Pac. 128;
and LeVine vs. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2,
Annotated Cases 1912-C page 407.
In the case at bar, appellants not only held the property for 33 months after discovering the alleged fraud,
but never did elect to rescind. The claim of fraud is an
after-thought.
Point 2: Whether or not appellants are entitled to
recover anything whatever from respondents on their theory of unjust enrichment.
12
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We are not unmindful of the rule laid down originally in the case of Malmberg vs. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218
Pac. 975, or of the subsequent cases which affirmed that
doctrine. But our examination of the Utah cases has
failed to disclose any case where the Malmberg doctrine
has been applied to facts like those here on this appeal.
Basicly, the theory of the Malmberg case, as we understand it, applies to a situation between an original vendor
and an original vendee, where the vendee through some
misfortune perhaps has defaulted, and is allowed to recover the excess of his payments over the vendor's damages.
That is not the case here. In our case we have the
situation of vendees <husband and wife) engaging in a
commercial or business transaction for the expressed
purpose of "earning a little extra money." (Dep. p. 68).
Appellant Vern C. Strand was gainfully employed at
Hill Field at the time of the purchase. Appellant Mrs.
Strand had previously worked during the marriage,
operating a beauty shop of her own, and thereafter had
worked at the Ogden Arsenal ( Dep. p. 9), and at the
time of Mr. Strand's deposition (July 23, 1958) Mrs.
Strand was operating the cafe owned by Appellants in
Nephi, Utah <Dep. p. 10). They did not move onto the
premises to live, but operated it as a commercial or
business venture through a hired manager (Dep. p. 37).
Appellants were shrewd enough · to make "some
repairs" and put "knotty pine on the front, put a false
front on it." <Dep. p. 59). And were business-like enough
to find buyers <Wattersons) and try to sell them the
place for $75,000.00. Failing to get that nice round figure, they took W attersons' offer of $63,000.00, thereby
earning themselves a comfortable profit of $21,500.00,
more than half again what they had paid for it, of which
they received an acknowledged $13,1_62.00 in money and
property for a down payment. Now no one would he
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naive enough to think for a moment that if the W attersons had remained on the premises and paid out their
contract the appellants would have divided their profit
with the respondents. That just isn't done in the business
world. Nor, in the business world, does an entrepreneur
ordinarily expect to be so highly favored by the law that
he can purchase property, put a false front on it, sell it
for more than SO% more than he paid for it, and then,
if market conditions change, or bad luck ensues, or the
new purchaser defaults, or he misjudges his abilities as
a manager, or neglects his business, fall back upon his
vendor with a claim for losses. We think this Court never
intended the Malmberg doctrine to go that far. And yet
that is what appellants are asking the Court to do on
this appeal.
In this case appellants made several bad decisions.
They got competent advice from a successful Motel
operator but acted contrary to that advice <Dep. pp. 13,
24, 35) ; decided they didn't need a builder to advise
them on the construction of the building (Dep. pp. 18,
64) ; and "would have been a lot better off" if they had
never sold to Wattersons at all. <Dep. p. 31). Had appellants not sold to W attersons they "could have made
their payments" and "could have paid the property out"
and would likely be in possession of the property to this
day. To make matters worse for appellants, they. got
tired of the responsibility of the Motel. Appellant Strand
said, in speaking of his negotiations with W attersons:
"but when they made that offer and I was killing myself
going out there and back every dog-goned night and my
wife was hollering about it, I took this offer." (Dep. p.
33). Later in his deposition he added: "I would have got
rid of one more headache, the trouble of going out there
every night." <Dep. p. 34). In other words appellants
got tired; the Motel was too much trouble; it was a
headache; they wanted out. And after they got out, even
though appellant Strand's training and experience was
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in the field of accounting, auditing and record keeping
(Dep. pp. 3, 5, 6, 7) he neglected to follow Wattersons,
Goldsbys, Clinger, Verda Lynn (Lind) or Lucy Semora
to see that the rental income came to him in the form of
payments. Illustrative of appellant Strand's weakening
attitude was his statement about going after Clinger to
get him to make the payments due him. l--Ie said of
Clinger: "He told me he couldn't pay me anything and I
started going out to the car and my wife came in and she
said by-golly she just had to have that money so then he
wrote out a check for $500.00 for the payment on the
place." <Dep. pp. 45, 46). And again, relative to the
same incident appellant Strand was asked whether or
not his wife \vere with him when he went after the
Goldsbys and Mr. Clinger and Verda Lind (Lynn). He
answered: "No, the ·only time she was with me is when
I went up to Clingers to collect money and he didn't
have it for me and she was there and squeezed it out of
him. She went in and said, 'you had better get some
money, we can't go on without money.' She bawled me
out in front of him ... She was out in the car and when
I went out she wanted to know what was holding me
up so long and I told her I couldn't get any money and
she jumped all over me and him too, and he went and
wrote this check". <For the $500.00). <Dep. p. 69). Then
appellant Strand volunteered another significant statement. He said: "Yes,· she is blaming me for all of this.''
<Dep. p. 69). And well she might. Her husband had
weakened on the Motel deal; he had gotten tired. He
should have taken his wife with him more often, and
should have gone more often himself to collect his payments, to "see that the rental income got into his hands_.
Again, appellant Strand's attitude is apparent from the
following:
Q. Then referring to January 8, 1958, the day
when the escrow holder turned the papers
back to Mr. Mayne, ho"\v many tenants \vere
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in the Motel?
A.

I don't know. I wasn't operating it.

Q.

Did you check at all to see how many tenants
were in there?

A.

No. That was Mr. Clinger's place at that time.

Q. You hadn't operated it since the 20th of March,
1957, when you sold to Wattersons.
A. Yes, it changed hands there and changed hands
and I was just the guy out here on the limb
that wasn't getting any money and was being
threatened, hurry and make these payments
and robbing my family of money to make
the payments when I didn't get them from those
people.
Q. You don't know what the tenancy situation
was then?
A. No.
<Dep. p. 58).
He set up no system for checking on the rental
income from W attersons or any of the other operators
of the Motel; made no arrangements to insist on collecting it himself for his own protection. He just let the
matter drift, hoping for his payments, complaining because he did not get them. Evidently it was too much
trouble for him.
Interestingly enough, he had his worst difficulties
before he sold to Wattersons. It was during that time
that the soldiers all moved out, the 451st group, "leaving
the units empty so to speak." (Dep. pp. 40, 60). It took
him about two months to get the tenancy back up to
normal. ( Dep. p. 61 ) . Like\vise, it was before he sold to
Wattersons that he had "some bad luck" with his tenants and couldn't collect from them, gave some of them
"sheriff's notice and everything, and I couldn't get them
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out." <Dep. p. 61). Yet with all this trouble he managed to
keep up his payments and was, with one exception, up
to date with his payments until he sold to W attersons.
It \Vas when he let down, got too tired to go out there
and back every night, and neglected to follow up with
the successive owners and operators to see where the rents
went, that the business went from bad to worse, and,
without the rental income, he couldn't meet his payments to respondents.
Now, whose fault was this? Certainly it was not
respondents'. Appellants must accept full responsibility
for their failure.
It would seem apparent that this case falls squarely
within the rule of Peck vs. Judd, supra, where this Court
said in part:
"We fail to see where the defendants have any
ground to complain unless it be in having overestimated the value of the property or in overestimating their ability as operators. * * *
"It is not our prerogative to step in and renegotiate the contract of the parties. * * * There is no
reason why we should consider the vendee priviledged and entitled to our intervention unless the
conditions sought to be imposed on the vendee
are unconscionable."
and equally within the rule stated by Chief Justice McDonough in Cole vs. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 Pac. 2d.
623, quoted in Peck vs. Judd, when he said:
" . . . In the absence of fraud or imposition the
parties are bound by the price or measure of value
they have agreed on, and such price must be paid
notwithstanding it may be excessive. The courts
cannot supervise decisions made in the business
world and grant relief when the bargain proves
improvident."
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ARGUMENT
From appellants' admission, there was no increase
in the rental value of the motel and premises involved
in this suit even though appellants allegedly spent $9,567.37 in repairing and improving the premises. To
award appellants judgment for moneys spent for improvements and repairs which did not increase the rental value or rental income of the property would be unjustly enriching the appellants by requiring respondents
to reimburse them for a bad or unwise investment.
Appellants' contention is that the property was
worth $35,000.00 when they bought it. Using the income approach to ascertain the value of the property,
then by appellants' admission that vvhatever improvements they may have added did not increase the rental
value or rental income, the property is still worth only
$35,000.00. Certainly the value of the property could not
have doubled while the income remained the same. Any
decision to make a vendor in an arms-length transaction
reimburse a vendee for money expended on repairs or
so-called improvements which do not produce any additional income, would be most unconscionable.
When appellants sold to W attersons they elected to
take their chances on a ne\v transaction which then
offered them a substantial profit, and in so doing elected
to cut themselves off from all recourse against their vendors (respondents herein) and from a possible claim for
unjust enrichment. By selling the property at a profit of
$21,500.00, appellants have a cause of action against
their vendees for loss of an advantageous bargain. To give
them also a cause of action against respondents for unjust enrichment would seem neither reasonable nor realistic, but wholly unconscionable. Thus, if appellants were
to succeed in this cause, where \vould appellants and respondents stand in relation to the appellants' transferees:
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Wattersons, Goldsbys, Clinger, Verda Lind (Lynn) and
Lucy Semora? If the appellants can be said to have a
cause of action against respondents for unjust enrichment in addition to a cause of action against W attersons
for loss of an advantageous bargain, where is the Court
going to stop in its effort to be pa temalistic towards these
appellants as vendees?
As indicated, appellants sold to the W attersons for
a profit of $21 ,500.00; and theW attersons thereafter sold
to Goldsbys and Clinger for some undisclosed advantage
or profit. Then Goldsbys and Clinger evidently sold to .
Verda Lind (Lynn) and Lucy Semora for some undisclosed advantage or profit. Where, as here, a vendee (appellants) sells for a substantial profit and upon default
of his transferee would have a right of action for loss of
an advantageous bargain against that transferee, justice
would seem to dictate that, if anyone, the last vendee
should be the only one permitted a right of action
against the original vendor. To hold otherwise, the Court
would be going beyond the bounds of reason to overprotect a party to a contract who has made a bad bargain.
Certainly the decisions of this Court, as we read them,
do not give evidence of favoring any such a paternalistic
attitude. In the instant case, the last vendee, Verda Lynn
(Lind), has had her day in court, and the matter is res
adjudicata.
·
Appellants are unable or unwilling to account for
the operational income while others were in control of the motel and premises, and, in fact, unable or
unwilling to account for their own operational income.
In Peck vs. Judd, supra, the Court put some emphasis on
the fact that the vendee in that case received $51,741.49
as rentals, and paid $36,767.56 to the vendors. In the pre;.
cent case the appellants, being unable or unwilling to
account for moneys that changed hands in subsequent
sales and in being unable or unwilling to account for
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rents received from operations of the motel and premises during the time they and their transferees were in possession, should not be heard to complain that there has
been unjust enrichment when they themselves cannot or
will not account for moneys they and their successors
have received in operation of the property. They should
be estopped in equity from claiming unjust enrichment
where such an accounting cannot be or is not made by
them. To hold otherwise would encourage parties to
such a contract to destroy their records or fail to keep
them, in order that they might one day sue for unjust
enrichment and not have to account for the money received from such an operation. Thus by appellants' own
dereliction they have not only made it "impractical or
extremely difficult" to fix any actual damage one way
or the other, they have made it impossible. Without that
accounting the Court cannot possibly make any mathematical calculation which might otherwise aid it in arriving at a conclusion with reference to the true facts. Having failed to account or specify in an affidavit their reasons for not accounting, the ruling of this Court in Dupler
vs. Yates, 10 U. 2d 251, 351 Pac. 2d 624, would seem
to be applicable. At page 637 of the Pacific volume this
Court said:
"Upon a motion for summary judgment, the
courts ought to recognize as a minimum, that the
opposing party produce some evidentiary matter
in contradiction of the movant's case or specify in
an affidavit the reason why he cannot do so."
See also Pender vs. Alix, 11 U. 2d 58, 354 Pac. 2d
1066.
.
If appellants' position in this case were to be upheld
or declared valid, then all pending escrow contracts are
insecure, and all persons holding any interest in any
escrow agreement, whether as the original vendor o,r. as
the purchaser or successive purchaser of the vendors In-
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terest, would be either buying a Ia,vsuit or be under the
constant threat of a lawsuit while the original vendee
and his transferees tested the market for a profit or a succession of profits until the escrow was paid out. A pandora's box of legal troubles would engulf the field of
escrow contracts.
It seems absurd to us to think that purchasers could
buy real property under contract for $41,500.00, and then
sell it for $63,000.00 for a profit of more than 50% of the
original cost, and be able, ·if their sale matured· as expected, to keep their profits; but, if their $63,000.00 sale did
not mature properly, be a·ble to fall back on their vendors
and claim a refund to minimize any possible loss. This
would be a "heads I win and tails you lose" 'proposition.
I_t is wholly inconsistent with the law of sales and entirely
inconsistent with the theory of free enterp~ise and- capitalism generally. When one takes anq assumes a risk
in business he takes the profits or t4e losses as they occur, and as his foresight and husines~ acumen dictate.
Otherwise, one could gamble \vith the property of another, profiting if successful and returning the property
if unsuccessful.
There is another insidious side-light to such a proposition. It would permit reckless or un,wise or imprudent individuals to take the property of their conservative
vendor and expend unwise sums on repairs or so-called
improvements, and then demand all or a substantial part
of his rash expenditures back if his improvements added
nothing to the income of the property. This is exactly
what has happened in the case at hand. The real value
of the property here lies in the rand, not the buildings.
Of what value were or are the so-called improvements to
the respondents \vhen appellants admit that their alleged improvements did not appreciably increase the
rental income (Appellants' answer 91 to respondents'
interrogatory 91, R. 50) and when appellants kept the
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rates "pretty much the same" as they were before. (Dep.
p. 26).
Certtainly this is not what this Court contemplated
in the Malmberg case, supra, or has contemplated in
cases subsequent to it. Appellants would have this Court
embark upon a new revolutionary path through the legal
wilderness by giving approval to a theory which is completely radical from all previous notions of property
rights and contracts for the sale of land.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we submit that appellants have no
possible claim against the respondents either for fraud
or for undue enrichment, and that the decision of the
trial court in granting respondents' motion for summary
judgment was correct and should be affirmed.
Dated this 31st day of August, 1962.
LEWIS J. WALLACE
ROBERT E. FROERER
Attorneys for Respondents
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